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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DEBATING THE END OF THE WORLD AND OTHER POINTLESS
ENDEAVORS: THOMAS v. STATE AND THE CIVIL COMMITMENT
OF SEX OFFENDERS IN MISSOURI AFTER KANSAS v. CRANE

I. INTRODUCTION
David Siebers served ten years for rape and armed robbery in Michigan.1
Just months after being released, he was caught trying to lure a ten year old girl
into his car with candy.2 Siebers was released from prison the second time in
September 2002, and since then has been forced to live in four different states
because of both government and public harassment.3 Since moving to New
Mexico, Siebers has been under constant surveillance by local police upon
orders of the mayor, had signs posted on a fence near where he lives that read
“Go back where you came from – Hell,” and has been physically assaulted
while doing yard work.4 The mayor of Albuquerque, who ordered police
surveillance, justified the action by saying that an FBI profile showed that
Siebers continues to be dangerous and “will re-offend.”5
Siebers represents the inherent problems with society’s struggle in dealing
with sex offenders. His situation illustrates both the patchwork manner in
which different states have dealt with the perceived continuing threat posed by
sex offenders and the inherent problems such a system creates, both for the
public at large and those previously convicted of sexual offenses.
The general public’s fear of convicted sex offenders has resulted in
legislatures being pushed hard to enact serious restraints and controls against a
group of individuals deemed dangerous to civilized society, particularly to
women and children. The most prominent example of this trend is the
institution of “Megan’s Law” in numerous states, mandating that
neighborhoods and local police officials be informed of the presence of a sex

1. Sex Offender Run Out of 4 States, CNN.com, Jan. 16, 2002 available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Southwest/01/16/sex.offender.ap/index.html (last visited Jan. 16,
2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. Siebers originally resided in Michigan upon his release from prison, then moved to
Ohio, where police bought him a bus ticket to Kentucky. Id. He has since moved in his trailer to
rural New Mexico. Id.
4. Sex Offender Run Out of 4 States, supra note 1.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
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offender residing in a community.6 This type of governmental action only
makes the public aware of the presence of such a threat. Sixteen states have
moved to more punitive and restrictive measures to protect society from the
threat of sexual predators, namely civil commitment of convicted sex
offenders.
The most prominent player in this new movement has been the state of
Kansas, which twice has had cases challenging its statute7 taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States. In the first case, Kansas v. Hendricks,8
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such statutes, finding that the
statute in question dealt with a civil, not criminal act, and did not violate the
double jeopardy or ex post facto lawmaking clause of the Constitution.9 The
Court further decided that the requirements for commitment in the Kansas
statute were sufficient to rebut any claims of violation of substantive due
Having upheld the constitutionality of these
process requirements.10
commitment actions, states then returned to the task of implementing their
statutes in light of Hendricks. It was the battle over this implementation in
Kansas that lead to the Supreme Court reaffirming Hendricks in Kansas v.
Crane.11
In Crane, the state of Kansas moved to have Michael Crane committed
under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.12 A Kansas District Court
ordered Crane committed for “treatment” after a trial,13 but the Kansas
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the Kansas and United

6. Megan’s Laws began in New Jersey and mandate that convicted sex offenders register
with local authorities and that communities be informed of a sex offender living in their
neighborhood. Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative
Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 315 (2001) (tracing the development of the legislative processes that
have led to the creation of such statutes).
7. KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 29a, §§ 59-29a01– 59-29a20 (Supp. 2002). The Kansas
Legislature passed the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act in 1994. The Act called for the
commitment of sexually violent predators in light of their likelihood “to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence if not treated for their mental abnormality or personality disorder . . . [and] to
address the special needs of sexually violent predators and the risks they present to society . . . .”
Id. at § 59-29a01. Subsequent sections of the Act describe how sexual predators are to be
identified, how civil commitment proceedings will be conducted, and how confinement of sexual
predators must proceed. Id. at §§ 59-29a02 – 59-29a20.
8. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). This case dealt with the commitment of Leroy Hendricks, a
Kansas man convicted of molesting two young boys. Id. at 353. For a complete discussion of
this case, see infra Section III, Part A.
9. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 369-370.
10. Id. at 360.
11. 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
12. Id. at 410-11. Crane was diagnosed by a state psychiatrist as suffering from both
exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 411. For a complete discussion of this
case, see infra Section III, Part B.
13. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.
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States Constitutions require “a finding that the defendant cannot control his
dangerous behavior” for such a commitment to be legal.14 The United States
Supreme Court in Crane vacated the Kansas Supreme Court decision that the
state must prove the offender has a total or complete lack of control in order to
be committed.15 To prevent this type of abuse, Crane established a distinction
between “the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment” and “the dangerous
but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”16 The Crane
Court was very concerned with the possibility that civil commitment could
“become a ‘mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’” instead of a
mechanism for sex offender treatment.17 Punishment for the Court is a
function of criminal law, not civil commitment.
Crane not only affected Kansas, but also every state with a sexually violent
predator statute, including Missouri.18 Fewer than four months after the Crane
decision, in May of 2002, the Missouri Supreme Court handed down its
interpretation of Crane’s “serious difficulty in controlling behavior”
requirement in Thomas v. State.19 The day before his scheduled release from
prison, the state of Missouri filed a petition to commit him as a sexual
offender.20 A jury trial of eight individuals found that the state had established
that Thomas was a sexually violent predator and ordered him committed.21
Thomas appealed this commitment order based on his argument that the statute
itself was unconstitutional and that the instructions given to the jury were
inadequate under both Hendricks and Crane.22
The Missouri Supreme Court decided that Crane requires an explicit jury
This
instruction on the level of difficulty in controlling behavior.23
14. Id. (citing In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286-88, 290 (Kan. 2000)).
15. Id. at 411, 415.
16. Id. at 413 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58).
17. Id. at 412 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurrence)).
18. Missouri’s sexual predator law reads similarly to the one from Kansas. It allows for the
civil commitment of “any person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person
more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility.” MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480 (1999).
19. 74 S.W.3d 789 (Mo. 2002). Eddie Thomas was convicted in 1982 of multiple sexually
violent offenses. Id. at 790. For a complete discussion of this case, see infra Section IV, Part A.
20. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790.
21. Id.
22. Id. Thomas’s case was considered along with the case of Desi Edwards, a convicted
child rapist who was targeted for commitment after being returned to prison for a parole violation
involving the use of alcohol. Id.
23. Id. at 792. The Court laid out the following instruction that must be given in these cases:
“As used in this instruction, ‘mental abnormality’ means a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually
violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his
behavior.” Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792.
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requirement of a specific jury instruction on this issue is one that has been
rejected by numerous other states with similar civil commitment statutes.24
Indeed, Chief Justice Limbaugh of the Missouri Supreme Court took the
opposite position in his dissenting opinion, believing instead that “the given
instruction, though couched in different language, necessarily required that
same ‘proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior.’”25 This conflict over
jury instructions is at the heart of the difficulties with the Crane decision.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Crane, identified this problem as necessarily
resulting from the majority’s decision. As he asked, “[h]ow is one to frame for
a jury the degree of ‘inability to control’ which, in the particular case, ‘the
nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality’
require?”26 While Justice Scalia keenly identified the coming split amongst the
states in interpreting Crane, his dissent also provided sufficient support for
Missouri and other courts that have mandated a specific jury instruction on
lack of control. Scalia’s entire line of argument shows the validity of the
Thomas approach and why Crane requires an explicit jury instruction on
inability to control behavior.
Section II of this Note will begin with a look at the history of civil
commitment of sexual offenders and the debate over the purpose and
constitutionality of these statutes, focusing on the motivations and
justifications for such laws and criticisms of the necessity and effectiveness of
such measures. Section III will consist of an in-depth analysis of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Hendricks and Crane and will lay a foundation for an
analysis of Missouri’s sexually violent predator law and the state Supreme
Court’s decision in Thomas. The analysis of Thomas will be completed in
Section IV and will be compared with other states’ interpretation of Crane.
Finally, in Section V, an analysis of the Thomas approach will be conducted.
By looking at both Missouri commitment cases subsequent to Thomas and
collateral issues dealing with commitment, this Note will conclude that the
dispute over jury instructions is a minor sideshow at best. Ultimately,
24. See In re Westerheide, 831 So. 2d 93, 109 (Fla. 2002) (finding instructions that required
jury to find serious difficulty without using such words acceptable); In re Commitment of John
Lee Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 2002) (finding a “nexus” between individual’s dangerousness
and mental disorder enough to satisfy Crane); People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459, 465 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002) (finding nature and severity of mental disorder in sexual predator cases enough to
satisfy constitutional standards); In re Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1058 (Mass. 2002) (finding mental
disorder and lack of control implicit in current jury instructions). But see In re Detention of
Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (finding that the jury instruction on the term “mental
abnormality” was inadequate because it did not require a showing of serious difficulty in
controlling behavior and adopting the instruction laid out by the Missouri Supreme Court in
Thomas). For a complete discussion of these cases, see infra Section IV, Part B.
25. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
26. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 423 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, who
wrote the majority opinion in Hendricks, joined in this dissent.
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requiring an instruction on difficulty in controlling behavior does not affect the
fear of sexual offenders that continues to drive the creation of such statutes and
almost universally guarantees the civil commitment of convicted sex offenders
by a jury of eight average citizens.
II. CIVIL COMMITMENT – HISTORY, JUSTIFICATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
Having a historical understanding of the development of this area of law
and some of the scientific evidence provides a unique insight into the
motivation for sexually violent predator laws. This section will examine other
governmental actions that deal with the “problem” of sexual offenders besides
sexually violent predator laws, analyze the history of commitment proceedings
in this century, and compare the scientific arguments regarding the sensibility
and fairness of civil commitment of sex offenders.
A.

“Megan’s Law” and Registration of Sex Offenders

The murder of Megan Kanka in 1994 prompted the first round of
registration and community notification laws dealing with sex offenders.27
Megan was raped and murdered by her neighbor Jesse Timmendequas, who
was twice convicted for sexual offenses involving minors. Timmendequas
luring her to her death with the promise of seeing a puppy.28 Megan’s parents
then began a public campaign to get the state legislature to pass a community
notification law. Their efforts resulted in New Jersey quickly passing the first
of what were to become known as “Megan’s Laws.”29 By 1996 Congress had
taken measures to require every state to adopt community notification
measures, and today every state has some version of Megan’s Law.30 These
laws were designed to deal with a growing national concern about habitual sex
offenders, and provide society with “a feeling of safety and offer[ing] citizens
a chance to conduct their lives accordingly.”31 These laws indeed meet the
goal of increasing society’s perception of safety, but at the same time raise
serious concerns about the rights, treatment, and even safety of men and
women labeled as society’s newest outcasts—the sex offender.32
27. Leora Sedaghati, Megan’s Law: Does it Serve to Protect the Community or Punish and
Brand Sex Offenders?, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 27, 27 (2001).
28. Id.
29. Filler, supra note 6, at 315-16.
30. Id. at 316.
31. Sedaghati, supra note 27, at 27.
32. See Alex B. Eyssen, Does Community Notification for Sex Offenders Violate the Eighth
Amendment’s Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment? A Focus on Vigilantism
Resulting From “Megan’s Law,” 33 ST. MARY’s L.J. 101 (2001) (arguing that such laws add
little additional benefits to the public and offer little assistance to communities in dealing with sex
offenders personally known to their victims and urging government officials to be proactive in
preventing vigilantism against sex offenders).
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Historical Development of Sex Offender Laws

To put the current developments of sexual offender laws in a proper
context, it is necessary to examine past societal attempts to manage sexual
offenders. Perhaps the best description of the twentieth century treatment of
sex offenders is that offered by Samuel Brakel and James Cavanaugh, who
have described this history as involving the so-called “pendulum effect.”33
Brakel and Cavanaugh have broken down approaches to dealing with sex
offenders in the twentieth century into four distinct periods: (1)
undifferentiated treatment; (2) rehabilitation; (3) a return to undifferentiated
treatment; and (4) the modern approach.34 A brief summary of each of these
periods amply demonstrates that the current batch of sexually violent predator
laws is not a new development or innovation, but rather a method of control
and problem resolution attempted unsuccessfully in our recent past.
Brakel and Cavanaugh identify the first period as that of “undifferentiated
treatment,” dating up to approximately 1930.35 During this period, sex
offenders were treated like most other criminals. Criminal convictions were
sought and incarceration was the accepted punishment, with the hope that the
specific offender and potential other offenders would be deterred from such
actions in the future.36 After the 1930s, a new approach to sexual offenders
began to emerge, with a new emphasis on rehabilitation and treatment of the
sex offender.37 Sexually deviant behavior was separated for legal purposes
from other types of criminal behavior to exact the rehabilitation and treatment
purpose.38 This period was to be the “heyday of the sexual psychopath
laws.”39
The rehabilitation period’s crowning endorsement can be traced to a 1940
Supreme Court decision, Pearson v. Probate Court, upholding the
constitutionality of the newly created statutes that called for separate treatment
of sex offenders.40 Brakel and Cavanaugh state that that decision:

33. Samuel J. Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and
Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 69 (2000).
34. Id. at 69-77.
35. Id. at 70.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 71.
38. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 71.
39. Id. at 70-71.
40. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (upholding a Minnesota
statute as both significantly narrow in constitutional terms and finding that it did not implicate
equal protection concerns). It is interesting to note that Brakel and Cavanaugh were critical of
this decision because “[i]t simply said—in a classic case of substituting conclusion for
argument—that there was ‘no reason for doubt’ that the legislature’s selection of the targeted
class had a ‘rational basis.’” Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 71. Evidence of such
circular logic is also found in later Supreme Court cases dealing with sex offender statutes and
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[R]eflected, as well as bolstered, the general optimism that prevailed in
relevant circles about the ability to identify and treat those among the
amorphous aggregation of sex offenders who would benefit from the
ministrations of the sexual psychopath laws.41

By the 1950s, more than half of the states had passed similar measures and
were processing hundreds of sex offenders through these statutes each year.42
Brakel and Cavanaugh attribute the success of these laws and efforts to the
substantial consensus that existed amongst the law and psychiatry as to the
mechanisms and objectives of the sex offender acts enacted by the states.43
The “rehabilitative ideal” was an idea held generally by members of both
professions, and “its implementation via indeterminate institutionalization in
treatment facilities in lieu of imprisonment went essentially unchallenged.”44
A number of developments led to the downfall of these statutes. First,
practical experience and scientific theory undercut the idea that sexual
psychopaths could be rationally distinguished from others exhibiting deviant
behavior and successfully treated.45 Second, a societal shift occurred, placing
more of an emphasis on “law and order” issues and calling for the adoption of
a more punitive approach to criminal offenders.46 These developments caused
more than half of the states to get rid of the sex offender statutes by the mid1980s and the remaining five states with sexually violent predator laws used
these laws so infrequently that they virtually did not exist.47
A decision by the Supreme Court would sound the death knell of these
efforts and mark the beginning of the third period Brakel and Cavanaugh
identify.48 In Specht v. Patterson, the Court mandated the use of almost all
procedural safeguards guaranteed to criminal defendants in commitment
proceedings.49 This decision, combined with the increasing questions about
the effectiveness of treatment, resulted in a return to the pre-1930s

may speak to inherent difficulties for justifying the unequal treatment of sex offenders. See infra
text accompanying note 119.
41. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 71.
42. Id. at 71-72. In the mid-1960s, California was committing sex offenders at the rate of
approximately 800 offenders per calendar year. Id.
43. Id. at 72.
44. Id.
45. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 73.
46. Id.
47. Id. The five states were Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington.
Id.
48. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (dismissing Colorado’s argument that its
version of the law was civil in nature and a type of sentencing decision, and instead requiring the
institution of significant procedural safeguards usually found in criminal trials).
49. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 73-74. These rights included a judicial hearing,
assistance of counsel, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, the right to present
witnesses and evidence, and the right to an appeal. Id.
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undifferentiated treatment from other types of criminal offenders.50 In the
1990s, a new rash of highly publicized cases of sexually violent crimes against
children recreated the impetus for the current set of sexual offender
commitment statutes that emerged in the states beginning in the early 1990s,
the modern or final period identified by Brakel and Cavanaugh.51
The earliest example of a highly publicized sexually violent crime against
a child occurred in Washington in 1989.52 At that time, Earl Shriner, a recently
released sex offender who had been serving time for the kidnapping and sexual
assault of two teenage girls, raped a seven-year-old boy and cut off the boy’s
genitals, leaving him to die.53 This heinous crime has been directly attributed
to the public outcry that led Washington’s legislators to pass the first in a new
line of sex offender laws.54
C. Scientific Studies on Sexual Offender Recidivism and Treatment
The debate on the danger posed by convicted sex offenders, like most
debates, has two sides. Dennis Doren, a frequent state expert witness in civil
commitment cases, believes that sexual recidivism for a certain group of
offenders is a rather common occurrence and that such repeat conduct is
currently under-reported.55 Doren argues that numerous factors, such as a
focus on convictions as opposed to accusations, limited timelines of analysis,
unreported crimes, and the ignoring of females as sex offenders, have all
contributed to the under-reporting and estimation of recidivism rates among
past sex offenders.56 According to Doren’s analysis and research, recidivism
for child molesters can be estimated conservatively at fifty-two percent, and
the conservative estimate for rapists is approximately forty percent.57 As he
states, these figures show that “sex offender recidivism is far more than a rare
event” as previous clinical studies have indicated, and the rates he has
established are such that “discriminating characteristics between recidivists
and non-recidivists may be useful in the differential prediction of which
offenders are likely to commit new sexual crimes and which are not.”58

50. Id. at 74.
51. Id. at 74-75. For a discussion of some of these states, see infra Section IV, Part B.
52. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 75.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Dennis M. Doren, Recidivism Base Rates, Predictions of Sex Offender Recidivism, and
the ‘Sexual Predator’ Commitment Laws, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 97 (1998).
56. Id. at 99-100.
57. Id. at 108.
58. Id.
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Others who have evaluated the topic of sex offender recidivism take issue
with the high rates that Doren has cited.59 The impression left by reading
studies in this field is that the varying types of offenders who are subject to
commitment under sexual predator statutes may re-offend in very different
manners and at very different rates. A good example of this dichotomy is the
comparative studies, which have been done on recidivism of rapists and child
molesters. Studies of rapists have found a higher risk of relapse into violent
behavior in the short term, while analysis of child molesters has revealed a
much longer period in which an offender might re-engage in high-risk sexual
behavior and a lesser ability to resist deviant sexual urges.60 Likewise, studies
on the behavior of rapists have found quite different motivations for deviant
sexual acts that result in differing abilities to control behavior.61 Some sex
offenders in this area arguably are driven to deviant behavior by poor impulse
control exhibited in a variety of behaviors, while others commit sexual assaults
as part of a criminal lifestyle incorporating frequent expressions of aggression
and control.62 Behavioralists studying this phenomenon have argued that these
variances among sex offenders should be taken into account in designing
programs of treatment and methods of preventing sexual predators from
lapsing into deviant behavior.63 The uncertainty of this area, combined with
the difficulties of assessment systems employed by states in assessing sex
offenders under their sexual predator statutes, have led some to conclude that
the current risk-assessment procedures that are vital to commitment
proceedings are so deficient that they undermine the validity of expert
testimony on the subject in a legal proceeding.64
Leonore Simon has taken this argument one step further, arguing that
studies show that sex offenders are neither specialists in sex crimes nor
mentally disordered.65 The implications of such findings in the realm of sexual
predator laws are apparent. As Simon argues, “legal and mental health
professionals continue to operate on the assumption that offenders who commit
sex crimes are mentally disordered, treatable, dangerous (if not treated), and at

59. See Richard Wollert, Adversarial Forum: An Analysis of the Argument That Clinicians
Under-Predict Sexual Violence in Civil Commitment Cases, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 171 (2001)
(arguing that Doren’s conclusions are based on untenable assertions).
60. Timothy J. McGuire, Correctional Institution Based Sex Offender Treatment: A Lapse
Behavior Study, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 57, 60 (2000).
61. Id. at 61.
62. Id.
63. Id. (arguing that greater attention needs to be paid to the early signs of lapse behavior
that are unique to different types of offenders to prevent recidivism).
64. Terence W. Campbell, Sexual Predator Evaluations and Phrenology: Considering Issues
of Evidentiary Reliability, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 111 (2000).
65. Leonore M.J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization, Mental
Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 275 (2000).
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high risk to reoffend with another sex crime.”66 These mistaken assumptions
result in an overly exclusive focus on sex offenders, which he believes lulls the
public into a false sense of security.67 According to Simon, “[t]he murderer,
robber, burglar, or addict moving into the neighborhood is no less likely to
commit crimes than is the convicted sex offender.”68 Ultimately,
[a]lthough some sex offenders are at a high risk to re-offend, there is no clear
empirical basis for assessing which sex offenders present the most immediate
risk for reoffending. Also, there is no evidence that sex offenders are any more
mentally disordered than general criminal offenders. The primary pathology
attributed to sex offenders, deviant sexual arousal, is beginning to be
discredited empirically.69

If Simon is correct, the entire foundation of sexual predator laws, based upon
the twin notions that sex offenders pose a special danger to the public and
suffer from a treatable mental illness, is severely weakened.
III. THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN – THE RATIONALE OF HENDRICKS AND
CRANE
In the early to mid-1990s, civil commitment laws began to spring up in a
number of states, and defendants began to raise new constitutional challenges
to these statutes. The Supreme Court had an important say in how these laws
were constructed and construed. The Court decided the constitutionality of
these measures in Hendricks, and then clarified its decision in Crane, a second
Kansas case that dealt with the actual requirements for committing a sexually
violent predator under a civil commitment act.
A.

Hendricks and the Constitutionality of Civil Commitment

The Supreme Court first tackled the issue of the constitutionality of sexual
predator laws in 1997 when it took up the case of Leroy Hendricks, a Kansas
man who was convicted of taking indecent liberties with two separate thirteenyear-old boys70 and was sentenced to serve between five and twenty years in
prison.71 The Kansas Legislature had enacted its version of a civil
commitment act in 1994 to deal with the special problem of sexually violent

66. Id. at 278.
67. Id. at 280.
68. Id. Simon believes that this is true because nearly three-quarters of general criminals
and sixty percent of rape and sexual assault offenders are on probation or parole and as a group,
recommit at a rate of sixty percent. Id. Of those on probation, approximately forty percent of
violent crime offenders are re-arrested in a three-year period, while only twenty percent of rapists
on probation are re-arrested in the same time period. Simon, supra note 65, at 280.
69. Id. at 284.
70. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351-53 (1997).
71. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996).
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predators.72 The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (“KSVPA”) allowed
for the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator for the purposes of
“long-term control, care and treatment.”73 The KSVPA defined a sexually
violent predator as:
Any person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual
violence.74

The KSVPA then defined what was meant by a mental abnormality:
[A mental abnormality is a] congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit
sexually violent offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the
health and safety of others.75

At his trial, Hendricks was called by the State of Kansas as a witness76 and
admitted that he was unable to control his sexual urges when he became
“stressed out.” He also admitted that he was a pedophile who was not cured of
his condition, despite his time in jail and his previous stays in mental
institutions.77 A jury found that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator. He
was committed by the State to a mental hospital where no treatment program
for sexual violent predators was in place at the time of his commitment.78 The
Kansas Supreme Court took up Hendricks’ appeal and in reading the
underlying motives of the KSVPA, decided that the Kansas statute violated the
substantive due process rights of those ordered committed under the KSVPA.79
The Kansas Supreme Court cited a number of reasons for reaching this
decision as to the constitutionality of civil commitment acts. In finding a
denial of proper due process, the court focused on the failure of the KSVPA to
72. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 351.
73. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 2002).
74. Id. at § 59-29a02(a).
75. Id. at § 59-29a02(b).
76. For a discussion of this ability of the state to call a target of a civil commitment
proceeding as a witness, see the discussion of evidentiary issues, infra Section V.
77. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Kan. 1996). Evidence was also admitted during
the trial to show that Hendricks had a long history of sexual abuse of children apart from the
incidents that led to his most recent arrest and confinement, including four cases of molestation
and one incident of indecent exposure. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 354.
78. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131. Hendricks was put in the custody of Larned State
Hospital at the order of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for the state of Kansas.
Id. While the Secretary’s office had negotiated with two prospective providers for the care and
treatment of those committed under the Act, no contract had been reached with either at the time
of Hendricks’ commitment. Id. Hendricks’ motion to dismiss based on this fact was denied by
the trial judge. Id. For a discussion of the available treatment options for sexual offenders, see
supra Section II.
79. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
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separate those subject to commitment under the KSVPA from other types of
criminal offenders. The court was also concerned about the failure of the
KSVPA to address issues of treatment, a fact the court relied on in viewing the
Act as a veiled attempt to continue incarceration of sexual offenders.80 In this
part of its decision, the court distinguished between mental illness, mental
abnormalities, and personality disorders. The KSVPA, according to the
Kansas Court, allows for the commitment of the latter, even though the U.S.
Supreme Court stated that “to indefinitely confine as dangerous one who has a
personality disorder or antisocial personality but is not mentally ill is
constitutionally impermissible.”81 The second conclusion the court reached
was based significantly on the legislative history of the KSVPA. The court
recognized that “[t]reatment with the goal of reintegrating [sexually violent
offenders] into society is incidental” and that “treatment for sexually violent
predators is all but nonexistent.”82 Having found predominate motives besides
treatment for the KSVPA, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the commitment
judgment against Hendricks.83
In 1996 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case and
handed down its decision in Hendricks in June 1997.84 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Clarence Thomas, overturned the decision of the Kansas
Supreme Court, and upheld the constitutionality of civil commitment
proceedings for sex offenders.85 In so doing, the majority refused to adopt the
“mental illness” standard that the Kansas Court adopted.86 In addition, the
Court dismissed all of Hendricks’ claims that commitment constituted
punishment and therefore violated double jeopardy and the ban on ex post
facto lawmaking.87
Justice Thomas rejected Hendricks’ claims that the KSVPA constituted a
criminal proceeding that rendered his confinement a punishment that violated
both the double jeopardy and ex post facto lawmaking provisions of the
Constitution.88 In one of the more interesting parts of the decision, Justice
Thomas found that the statute was civil on its face and a statute in which the
legislature did not seek “to create anything other than a civil commitment

80. Id. at 136.
81. Id. at 138 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992) (allowing the release of a
defendant who was found guilty at trial by reason of insanity and who no longer was insane, but
who was still considered dangerous because of his anti-social personality)).
82. Id. at 136.
83. Id. at 138.
84. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 358.
87. Id. at 358-63.
88. Id. at 360-61.
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scheme designed to protect the public from harm.”89 Justice Thomas reached
this decision despite the fact that the Kansas district court found in its
examination of the legislative history of the KSVPA, that it was designed to
allow the indefinite confinement of those who are dangerous but not mentally
ill.90
The Court also did not find the KSVPA to be criminal in nature because it
did not have the twin goals of criminal law, namely retribution and
deterrence.91 Justice Thomas instead held that the fact that the KSVPA
subjected more than those who were convicted of previous offenses to
commitment, meant that the KSVPA did “not affix culpability for prior
criminal conduct” but rather used such conduct “solely for evidentiary
purposes.”92 The deterrence element was not met because people suffering
from a “mental abnormality” are unable to control their behavior and are thus
“unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement.”93 Confinement in a
mental institution is not considered to be as restrictive as a confinement in
prison. Those committed to a mental hospital under a sexually violent predator
law do not fall within the definition of those being punished by the State.94
The majority opinion also recognized that a “finding of dangerousness,
standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify
indefinite involuntary commitment.”95 This finding had to be coupled with an
additional factor, such as mental illness, “limit[ing] involuntary civil
commitment to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them
dangerous beyond their control.”96 The additional requirements in the KSVPA
are the terms “mental abnormality” and “personality disorder.”97 Justice
Thomas reasoned that both terms allow the statute to meet the requirement that
“it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are
unable to control their dangerousness.”98 Hendricks then was adequately
distinguishable from “other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly
dealt with exclusively though criminal proceedings” and not in the position of
having his due process rights violated.99

89. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
90. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996). For an examination of the problems
and inherent liabilities involved in a determination that these sexually violent predator statutes are
actually civil and not criminal proceedings, see infra Section V.
91. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.
92. Id. at 362.
93. Id. at 362-63.
94. Id. at 363.
95. Id. at 358.
96. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
97. Id. at 362.
98. Id. at 358.
99. Id. at 360.
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Justice Thomas also addressed the treatment issue raised by the Kansas
Supreme Court. Justice Thomas found that availability of treatment was not a
precondition to constitutional civil commitment as a sexually violent predator,
but rather that “civil confinement of the dangerously insane” is acceptable even
if no form of treatment exists.100 Justice Thomas disagreed with the Kansas
Supreme Court that the focus on punishment renders the KSVPA
unconstitutional, finding instead that even if punishment were the overriding
purpose of the KSVPA, “this does not rule out the possibility that an ancillary
purpose of the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require [the Court]
to conclude that the Act is punitive.”101 Kansas’ attempt at treatment then, no
matter how meager, fits the requirement that confinement must not double as
punishment.102
Having established the civil nature of the KSVPA, Justice Thomas quickly
dismissed any arguments about double jeopardy and ex post facto lawmaking.
Determining that the statute is a proper civil remedy that is not punishment, the
fact that Hendricks was finishing a prison sentence when proceedings against
him began did not affect the double jeopardy analysis.103 Justice Thomas then
found the ex post facto argument to be “similarly flawed,” as it applies
exclusively to criminal statutes and not civil laws.104 Each of the findings by
Justice Thomas was based on his analysis of the punitive and civil nature of the
KSVPA, and it was for these conclusions that he was widely criticized.
The first group to challenge Thomas’ majority opinion in Hendricks was
the dissenters, led by Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer, like Justice Thomas, did
not adopt the substantive due process approach taken by the Kansas Supreme
Court.105 Instead, the dissent took issue with the argument that the KSVPA
was simply an effort at civil commitment, arguing instead that it was an effort
at further punishment of sex offenders like Hendricks.106 For Breyer,
“[c]ertain resemblances between the Act’s ‘civil commitment’ and traditional
criminal punishments are obvious.”107
The key factor in Breyer’s punitive analysis was the fact that any treatment
that may be available is delayed until after the completion of a prior prison
sentence.108 The fact that the Kansas Supreme Court found the purpose of the
KSVPA to be mainly punitive, combined with the fact that “[t]he Act explicitly

100. Id. at 366.
101. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367.
102. Id. at 368-69.
103. Id. at 369 (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966)).
104. Id. at 370.
105. Id. at 373. (agreeing with the majority’s assessment as to the definition of “mental
abnormality”).
106. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 373.
107. Id. at 379.
108. Id. at 381.
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defers diagnosis, evaluation, and commitment proceedings until a few weeks
prior to the ‘anticipated release’ of a previously convicted offender from
prison,” helped the dissent reach the conclusion that treatment was not a
particularly important objective to the Kansas Legislature when it wrote the
KSVPA.109
The Hendricks decision has also been attacked as being an abuse of civil
commitment, ignorant of the work that had been done in the field of mental
illness, and blatantly unconstitutional. As one scholar noted, “[i]t is bad law,
bad social policy, and bad mental health.”110 In attacking the mental health
aspects of the opinion, Michael Perlin also deemed Hendricks a “confused and
confusing opinion” that helped move sex offenders into the role of “monsters,”
which was previously occupied by the mentally ill.111 Reflecting the historical
work of Brakel and Cavanaugh, Perlin described the newest round of sex
offender laws as a reaction to the least understood form of criminal behavior
and an “ominous[] returning to the days of what many of us had thought was a
less enlightened, and thus discarded, past.”112 Perlin believed that the
pressures that helped create the newest batch of sexual predator laws also
caused commitment proceedings to become pretextual, with judges and expert
witnesses working to ensure the commitment of individuals who they believe
need to be institutionalized, regardless of the individual’s actual psychological
condition.113
Similar criticisms attack Hendricks on constitutional terms, disagreeing
with Justice Thomas’s decision that the KSVPA did not violate either
substantive due process or the double jeopardy clause. Critics postulate
different reasons for the Court’s supposed inability to recognize the criminal
nature of the Kansas statute and its punitive nature, but agree on the fact that
the Court was too quick to dismiss the contention that Kansas had actually
created a civil law that was another form of punishment and deterrence.114
Critics of the decision almost universally have expressed one sentiment—
109. Id. at 385-86.
110. Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success Like Failure/And Failure’s No Success At All”:
Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 N.W. U. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1998).
111. Id. at 1248-49.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1252, 1258.
114. See, e.g., Andrew D. Campbell, Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning of
Punishment, States Are Permitted to Violate Double Jeopardy Clause, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87
(1998) (arguing that the double jeopardy decision is inconsistent with prior decisions on that
subject and that the failure of the Court to give a clear meaning to the term punishment
significantly decreases Fifth Amendment protections against a police state); Adam D. Hirtz,
Lock’Em Up and Throw Away the Key: Supreme Court Upholds Kansas’ Sexually Violent
Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 545 (1998) (arguing that the Court
employed faulty logic in demeaning the act nonpunitive and got caught up in the emotion of the
conduct at issue in making its decision).
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Hendricks is an abuse of governmental powers and an abuse of civil
commitment, and the decision’s endorsement of civil commitment with little
scrutiny of the methodology employed by the state of Kansas poses a
significant threat to individual freedom and liberty.115
B.

Crane and the Necessary Standard of Lack of Control for Commitment

Kansas would again be the battleground for the next major case to deal
with the issue of civil commitment of sex offenders. The case involved the
commitment proceedings of Michael Crane, who pled guilty to one count of
sexual battery arising from an incident in which he entered a video store and
attempted to force a female employee to perform oral sex upon him.116
Interestingly, although it implicitly referenced its belief and finding in In re
Hendricks that the KSVPA was unconstitutional in its focus on punishment
rather than treatment,117 the Kansas Supreme Court worked within the
framework laid out by Justice Thomas’ majority opinion in Hendricks to attack
the manner in which the jury was instructed as to Crane’s inability to control
his own behavior.118
The controlling issue in the case, as laid out by the court, was “whether it
is constitutionally permissible to commit Crane as a sexual predator absent a
115. One commentator described the problem this way:
The Court’s deference on this issue worries many commentators and judges because it
may impose no limits on whom a state can civilly commit. For instance . . . a state can
[possibly] civilly commit individuals who commit violent crimes and who suffer from
antisocial personality disorders. Like the elements of criminal laws, however, the Court
has traditionally deferred to state legislators regarding civilly confinable mental illness.
Brian J. Pollock, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable Standard for “Mental Illness” or a Push
Down the Slippery Slope Toward State Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 34849 (1998).
116. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286 (Kan. 2000).
117. See id. at 287. The Court goes through a detailed analysis of the interactions of the
victim and the prosecutor in these cases during its initial laying out of the factual background of
the case. The Court first described how the victim was convinced by the prosecutor to go along
with Crane’s initial guilty plea. The prosecutor stated that obtaining a guilty plea “was the best
way to go in order to be able to go down the line” and use the option of the Act. The victim
agreed to the plea bargain because she believed “it was the only way to make sure that it didn’t
end there.” Id. (quoting victim’s testimony at civil commitment proceeding). The victim then
testified at the commitment proceeding that she understood that if the prosecution could get
“some kind of conviction,” then the KSVPA could be used “later down the road to make sure he
stays off the street.” Id. The prosecutor at the civil commitment case then used this information
in his examination of the witness when he asked her the following questions:
So would it be fair to say that for a crime that this Court gave a 35-to-life sentence to Mr.
Crane, he only served a little over four years? . . . [a]nd understandably you’re very upset
about how the system treated you in this case, right?
Id. The Court then proceeded to drop this issue completely in its analysis of the case and instead
focused solely on the issue of ability to control behavior. In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 287.
118. Id. at 287-88.
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showing that he was unable to control his dangerous behavior.”119 The Kansas
Court answered this question in the negative, agreeing with Crane that the
Hendricks decision “read a requirement of inability to control behavior into the
Act in order to uphold its constitutionality.”120 The court said this reading of
Hendricks resulted from “the plain language of the majority opinion,”
particularly Justice Thomas’ idea that such a statute must limit involuntary
confinement to those whose difficulty in controlling behavior renders them
dangerous beyond their own control.121 It was here that the Kansas Court was
to make its finding that would become the epicenter of future analysis of this
line of cases. The court decided that, while there was some evidence that
Crane had difficulty controlling his behavior, he was diagnosed only with a
“personality disorder.”122 Because the issue of ability to control behavior was
a jury issue, and the jury in Crane’s case was not instructed to make a finding
regarding Crane’s inability to control his behavior, this failure to so instruct the
jury necessitated the reversal and remand of the commitment decision.123 The
argument regarding how to instruct a jury on the ability to control behavior and
the necessity of doing so was the major issue in the Crane line of cases.
The United States Supreme Court again granted certiorari and addressed
the issue of the constitutional requirements necessary for the KSVPA. The
Court vacated the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, but did so while
generally agreeing with that Court’s assessment of the Hendricks decision.
This decision acts as a fine bit of irony because it was written by Justice
Breyer, a dissenter in Hendricks. Two justices, Scalia and Thomas, dissented
in Crane, and Thomas was the justice who wrote the majority opinion in
Hendricks.124
The reason that the Court in Crane vacated and remanded the decision of
the Kansas Supreme Court was that it read the Kansas decision to require a
showing of complete lack of control. As the Court frequently noted, the
reference in Hendricks to difficulty in maintaining control of behavior is not an
absolute requirement.125 The majority was quick to make clear that the
decision to vacate did not indicate agreement with the State of Kansas’
position that the Constitution and Hendricks allow commitment of a dangerous

119. Id. at 287.
120. Id. at 290.
121. Id. at 290.
122. In re Crane, 7 P.3d at 290.
123. Id.
124. For these reasons, Crane serves as an excellent example of Justices “switching sides” in
order to moderate an opinion or to mitigate the effects of a previous opinion. For a broader
discussion of this idea, see Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Bernard Schwartz & James A. Thompson,
Inside the Supreme Court: A Sanctum Sanctorum? 66 MISS. L.J. 177 (1996).
125. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411-12 (2002).
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sexual offender “without any lack-of-control determination.”126 Rather, the
Hendricks decision underscored the importance of making distinctions
between sexual offenders subject to commitment and those more appropriately
dealt with through the criminal justice system.127 As the Court noted, “[t]hat
distinction is necessary lest ‘civil commitment’ become a ‘mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence’ – functions properly those of criminal law,
not civil commitment.”128 Having clearly established the need for the state to
demonstrate the respondent’s difficulty in controlling behavior, the majority in
Crane proceeded to muddy the waters, creating confusion among state courts
on the issue of lack of control.
Justice Breyer, in discussing lack of control, said that this concept cannot
be defined with “mathematical precision,” but rather proof of serious difficulty
in controlling behavior is enough to meet this new requirement that the Court
had laid out in interpreting Hendricks.129 In a bit of circular logic, Breyer then
defined the concept of difficulty in controlling behavior, which he earlier
identified as the distinguishing characteristic between those subject to civil
commitment and those appropriately handled in the criminal justice system, in
the following passage:
And [the serious difficulty in controlling behavior], when viewed in light of
such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the
severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.130

As the majority opinion recognized, “Hendricks as so read provides a less
precise constitutional standard.”131 Believing that a bright-line rule was
inappropriate in this situation, the Court instead left states with the assurance
that “our cases suggest that civil commitment of dangerous sexual offenders
will normally involve individuals who find it particularly difficult to control
their behavior.”132 This assessment may fall in line with the average jury’s
view of someone subject to commitment, but it does not reflect the current
struggle amongst the various states that have taken up the issue over what this
new requirement necessitates.
As mentioned previously, Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in Crane.
The dissent focused on the necessity that courts enforce an additional
126. Id. at 412.
127. Id. See supra text accompanying note 114.
128. Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372-73 (1996)
(Kennedy, J. concurring)).
129. Id. at 413.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 414.
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requirement of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Justice Scalia
insisted that the Hendricks opinion required that the “finding of a causal
connection between the likelihood of repeat acts of sexual violence and the
existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ necessarily
establishes ‘difficulty if not impossibility’ in controlling behavior.”133 For
Scalia then, the existence of the mental or personality disorder that results in
the likelihood of recidivism established the difficulty of controlling behavior
by itself.134
Justice Scalia did recognize that the variable degree of difficulty finding
required by the majority would leave trial courts without a clue as to how to
instruct the jury under these new standards.135 Justice Scalia believed this
failure of the majority to define the new standard for adequate jury instructions
resulted from the Court’s inability to articulate a plausible standard.136 He
went so far as to criticize the majority as “irresponsible” for leaving the law “in
such a state of utter indeterminacy.”137 While one can argue the validity of
both viewpoints on the question of the defendant’s difficulty in controlling
behavior as outlined in Crane, the resulting split among state courts on the
issue of jury instructions regarding the difficulty in controlling behavior
requirement lends significant credence to Scalia’s position on this issue.
IV. DEFINING THE “LESS PRECISE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD”: THOMAS AND
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE CRANE DECISION
The majority and the dissent in Crane acknowledged that the lack of
control standard as laid out in that case was either deliberately imprecise or
irresponsibly indeterminate.138 A major split has arisen since the Crane

133. Crane, 534 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 419-20.
135. Id. at 423.
136. Id. at 423-24.
137. Id. at 424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia goes on to criticize the majority’s opinion in
even harsher terms:
Today’s holding would make bad law in any circumstances . . . it both distorts our law
and degrades our authority. The State of Kansas, unable to apply its legislature’s sexual
predator legislation as written because of the Kansas Supreme Court’s erroneous view of
the Federal Constitution, sought and received certiorari in Hendricks, and achieved a
reversal, in an opinion holding that “the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act comports
with substantive due process requirements,” [citation omitted]. The Kansas Supreme
Court still did not like the law and prevented its operation . . . once again. The State of
Kansas again sought certiorari, asking nothing more than reaffirmation of our 5-year-old
opinion—only to be told that what we said then we now unsay. There is an obvious
lesson here for state supreme courts that do not agree with our jurisprudence: ignoring it is
worth a try.
Crane, 534 U.S. at 424.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 124-37, 129-31.
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decision regarding what the new standard means, and more precisely, what this
decision requires of trial courts. The particular problem is what instructions on
lack of control the trial judge must give to the jury. This section will examine
Missouri’s approach to the problem, how other states have dealt with the issue
in comparison, and which of the alternatives suggested by these various state
courts meets the requisite intent and standard laid out by Crane and so
vehemently opposed by the dissent in that case.
A.

Thomas and the Need for a Lack of Control Instruction

Eddie Thomas was convicted in 1982 of multiple counts of forcible rape
and forcible sodomy. All of his victims were minors.139 After serving
seventeen years of a twenty-three year sentence, Thomas was scheduled to be
released in the summer of 1999.140 Before his release date, the State of
Missouri petitioned to have him committed by the Missouri Department of
Mental Health in accordance with Missouri’s sexual predator law.141 As the
Thomas court recognized, the Kansas and Missouri sexual predator acts are
virtually the same in all aspects relevant to this case.142 Missouri’s definition
of a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment, below, is
substantially the same as the Kansas statute:
[A]ny person who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person
more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not
confined in a secure facility and who . . . [h]as pled guilty or been found
guilty . . . of a sexually violent offense.143

Likewise, Missouri treats the issue of a mental abnormality that qualifies a
sexual predator for commitment in similar terms to Kansas:

139. Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 790 (Mo. 2002). Thomas’s case was considered in
conjunction with that of Desi Edwards. Edwards was convicted of raping a child in 1989 and
served eight years of a ten year sentence. Id. Edwards was released on parole in 1997, but was
returned to prison after he violated his parole by using alcohol and failing to pay required fees.
Id. During this second incarceration, the State of Missouri moved to have Edwards committed
under the state’s sexual predator law. Id.
140. Id.
141. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790. Missouri’s Sexual Predator Statute can be found at MO.
REV. STAT. § 632.480 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
142. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790.
143. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(5). Kansas’s statute reads as follows: “any person who has
been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 2002).
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[A] congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.144

The similarity between these two statutes allowed the Thomas court to conduct
the analysis of the case under the direct precedent of Crane, and allowed the
justices to address challenges both to the constitutionality of the Missouri
statute and the validity of the jury instructions given at their commitment
proceedings at the same time.145
The Thomas court easily dismissed the first question because both
Hendricks and Crane directly upheld the validity of a nearly identical sex
offender commitment act in light of concerns about substantive due process,
double jeopardy, and ex post facto law making.146 How these decisions, and in
particular the Crane decision, affected the jury instruction issue became the
focus of Thomas. To best understand the Thomas decision, it is necessary to
look at how the juries in the cases at issue were instructed.
In the original trials for both Thomas and Edwards, the trial judges gave
the juries the following instructions:
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the
respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, and . . . that as a result of this
abnormality the respondent is more likely than not to engage in predatory acts
of sexual violence if he is not confined in a secure facility, then you will find
respondent is a sexually violent predator.147

The instructions then went on to define mental abnormality exactly as the
statute does,148 and to define “predatory” as “acts directed towards strangers or
individuals with whom relationships have been established or promoted for the
primary purpose of victimization.”149 The Missouri Supreme Court found
these instructions to be deficient under the Crane standard.150
After summarizing some of the relevant portions of the Crane and
Hendricks decisions, the Thomas court made it clear that it believed these
decisions uphold the constitutionality of sexual predator commitment laws so
long as there is evidence to establish that the “mental abnormality” or
“personality disorder” of the respondent causes serious difficulty in controlling
their behavior and that the jury must also be instructed that the degree to which
the person cannot control his or her behavior reaches the level of “serious

144. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.480(2) (2000). The Kansas statute reads exactly the same as the
Missouri statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1994).
145. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790.
146. Id. at 791.
147. Id. at 790.
148. See supra note 144.
149. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 790.
150. Id.
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difficulty.”151
Thomas further concluded that the “serious difficulty”
requirement found by the Supreme Court in Crane is simply a refinement of
the term “mental abnormality,” not an addition of a newly created
constitutional element to the validity of sex offender commitment laws.152 The
clarification of “mental abnormality” by Crane and Thomas requires a specific
type of jury instruction that was not given in either of the Missouri cases at
issue. A proper jury instruction must inform the jury of the “serious difficulty”
in controlling behavior requirement in order to comply with Crane.153
Chief Justice Limbaugh of the Missouri Supreme Court took issue with
these findings of the Thomas majority in his dissent.154 Limbaugh’s basic
contention was that “the Supreme Court made no mention whatsoever of the
need for a new instruction” in Crane.155 He instead insisted in his dissent that
the instruction given to the juries, “though couched in different language,”
required the jury to reach the same conclusions regarding serious difficulty in
controlling behavior as required in Crane.156 Limbaugh reached this decision
through his argument that Crane was simply a clarification of “the
constitutional threshold on which the Kansas statute had already been
upheld.”157 Limbaugh believed that proving the existence of a “mental
abnormality” that makes the individual more likely to commit future acts of
sexual violence is a permissible way for the jury to find “serious difficulty in
controlling behavior.”158
Chief Justice Limbaugh went on to argue that the Supreme Court’s
reaffirmation of the main holdings of Hendricks in Crane precludes the
conclusion that a new instruction must be given because of its failure to
distinguish between sex offenders who are simple recidivists and those whose
mental condition make them subject to civil commitment.159 If the majority’s
opinion were true, according to Limbaugh, Crane would then be requiring a
new constitutional element within sexual predator statutes.160 The proper
recourse for such a finding would be to strike down the statute as
151. Id. at 791.
152. Id. at 792 n. 1.
153. Id. at 792. The entire instruction laid out by the Court read as follows:
As used in this instruction, “mental abnormality” means a congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty
in controlling his behavior.
Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792.
154. Id. (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 792-93.
159. Id. at 793.
160. Id.
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unconstitutional, rather than rewriting the instruction, which effectively means
rewriting the statute itself.161 Limbaugh believed this is what the majority had
done, and he dismissed their argument that the new instruction is simply a
“refinement” of existing language in the statute.162 As he argued in summary,
if the old instruction was not constitutionally valid, the new instruction with
different language “must mean something different than that used in the
instruction that was given.”163 Such an interpretation should have required the
court to decide that the instruction given was sufficient under Crane.164
B.

Other State Approaches to a Lack of Control Instruction

A number of states, which have handled this issue since Crane was handed
down, have reached different conclusions than that of the Missouri Supreme
Court. At least five other states have taken a different approach to the
connection of dangerousness and mental abnormality that Thomas
embraced.165 To illustrate these differences, this portion of the Note will
examine other states that have handed down similar decisions disagreeing with
the Thomas approach to the dangerousness requirement and the need for jury
instructions on that matter.
Florida’s Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act (the “Ryce
Act”) allows for the commitment of “sexually violent predators”166 who suffer
from a “mental abnormality.”167 In 1999, a jury found Mitchell Westerheide,
who had been convicted for lewd and lascivious assault on a child and sexual
performance on a child, to be a sexually violent predator subject to
commitment under the Ryce Act.168 After dismissing Westerheide’s claims of
double jeopardy and other constitutional challenges to the statute based on both

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Thomas, 74 S.W.3d at 793.
164. Id.
165. In addition to the states discussed in this Note, other states with sexual predator laws
have also taken up this issue. See, e.g., People v. Ghilotti, 44 P.3d 949 (Cal. 2002) (rejecting the
necessity of an explicit jury instruction on difficulty in controlling behavior and interpreting the
link between mental disorder and dangerousness as satisfying Crane because the particular form
of dangerousness, a mental disorder, not the particular degree of dangerousness, distinguishes
individuals subject to commitment from the typical recidivist).
166. Defined as anyone who “[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and . . .
[s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage
in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(a), (b) (2002).
167. Defined as “a mental condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.” FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394.912(5) (2002).
168. Westerheide v. Florida, 831 So.2d 93, 97 (Fla. 2002).
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Hendricks and Crane, the Florida Court turned to the issue of dangerousness
and jury instructions.
Much like Chief Justice Limbaugh’s arguments in Thomas, the Florida
Supreme Court decided that Crane did not require a specific jury instruction,
but rather only that there be proof of “serious difficulty in controlling
behavior.”169 The majority found the instruction given in this case meant the
jury had to conclude that Westerheide’s ability to control his dangerous
behavior was impaired to the point that he posed a threat to others. The court
concluded this despite the fact that the words “serious difficulty” were not
used, but simply that their meaning was conveyed to the jury.170 To further
justify this conclusion, the court looked to the lack of a “bright-line rule” in
Crane regarding the lack of control determination, and, as others before,
pointed to Justice Breyer’s allusion to the lack of “mathematical precision”
regarding the level of dangerousness necessary for a statute to remain
constitutionally firm.171
Wisconsin’s Supreme Court reached a similar decision in the case of John
Lee Laxton.172 Laxton had been convicted on five different counts of sexual
assault and child abduction and was paroled in 1994.173 His parole was
revoked shortly thereafter when he was caught window peeping on two young
female children. Before his second scheduled release, the state of Wisconsin
moved to have him committed under the state’s sexually violent person act.174
This statute defined the key terms for commitment in substantially the same
way as those previously discussed.175
169. Id. at 107.
170. Id. at 108. The jury instructions read as follows:
[M]ental condition affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses. The term volitional means
the act of will or choosing or the act of deciding or the exercise of will . . . [L]ikely to
engage in acts of sexual violence means a person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual
violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.
Id.
171. Id. at 109.
172. In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. 2002).
173. Id. at 787.
174. Id.
175. The statute defines “sexually violent person” as:
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of or not
responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental disease, defect
or illness, and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from mental disorder that
makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (1998).
“Mental disorder” is defined as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual
violence.” WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (1998).
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The jury in Laxton was instructed that the State must prove three elements
beyond a reasonable doubt before they could order Laxton committed. They
were that he “[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . has a
mental disorder . . . [and] is dangerous to others because he has a mental
disorder which creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of
sexual violence.”176
The majority in Laxton upheld this instruction, finding as Westerheide did,
that neither a separate factual finding nor a separate jury instruction was
necessary on the issue of the sex offender’s level of difficulty in controlling
behavior.177 Instead, evidence of a lack of control requirement identified in
Crane could be established “by evidence of the individual’s mental disorder
and requisite level of dangerousness,” which would distinguish the sex
offender who has serious difficulty controlling behavior from the “dangerous
but typical recidivist.”178
The Laxton court justified this conclusion by saying that the due process
requirement identified in Crane is satisfied by the Wisconsin’s statute’s
“nexus” between an individual’s dangerousness and that person’s mental
disorder.179 In order to commit a person under the statute, it must be
established that a person is sexually violent, and this necessarily requires proof
“that the person’s mental disorder includes serious difficulty in controlling his
or her behavior.”180 The court believed that the Laxton jury, in finding it
substantially probable that Laxton would engage in future acts of sexual
violence, must have concluded that his mental abnormality created for him a
serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.181
Mirroring the dynamics of Thomas, the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court dissented from the majority opinion in Laxton. As opposed to
the majority’s detailed discussion of other issues, Chief Justice Abrahamson

176. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 787.
177. Id. at 793.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 794 (emphasis added). Wisconsin’s Supreme Court is one of the few courts that
has tackled this issue that has not assumed that those targeted for commitment will be males.
Missouri’s Court of Appeals for the Eastern District dealt with the commitment case of a female
sex offender shortly before the publication of this Note. In that decision, the court ordered the
release of the woman on the basis that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a finding
that a female defendant was more likely than not to reoffend. In re Coffel, 2003 WL 716682, No.
ED 79989 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003). The Missouri Court of Appeals rendered its decision
shortly before publication of this Note. See In re Coffel, 2003 WL716682, No. ED79989 (Mo.
Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003). For a study of female sexual offenders, see Catherine A. Lewis and
Charlotte R. Stanley, Women Accused of Sexual Offenses, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 73 (2000)
(finding that women accused of sexual offenses have a high likelihood of past or ongoing sexual
and physical victimization).
181. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 795.
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focused her entire dissent on the issue she believed to be the only important
one of the case: “whether the jury instructions in the present case correctly
advised the jury that it must be persuaded . . . that Laxton had serious difficulty
in controlling his behavior.”182 She concluded that the jury instructions did not
reach this standard and that, as a result, the validity of the jury determination
must be called into question and vacated.183
Chief Justice Abrahamson reached this conclusion because she believed
the instructions could not have informed a reasonable jury that it needed to find
that Laxton had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior in order to issue a
commitment order.184 Justice Abrahamson accused the majority of reading “a
constitutional gloss” into the sexual predator statute that would require a jury
to act in a similar manner in order to correctly reach a proper decision on the
issue of reasonableness.185 However, Justice Abrahamson believed this to be
impossible because the serious difficulty in controlling behavior requirement
of Crane does not equate with the Wisconsin instruction mandating a jury to
find a mental disorder that affects “an individual’s emotional or volitional
capacity.”186 Such an instruction as the one given did not require the jury to
distinguish between sex offenders rendered dangerous because of their mental
condition and ordinary recidivists, which was the overriding concern of
Crane.187
The Illinois Supreme Court also decided that no specific instruction was
required in People v. Hancock.188 Two court-appointed psychologists
diagnosed Hancock as a pedophile and voyeur with a history of exhibitionism,
but disagreed over whether a pedophile was automatically sexually
dangerous.189 While the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider
Hancock’s prior sexual history in making its determination, it did not require a
specific determination of lack of volitional control.190 Hancock appealed his
conviction, but the Illinois Supreme Court decided that because the nature and
severity of the mental disorder in sex predator cases distinguish individuals
subject to commitment from the typical recidivist, the instructions given at the

182. Id. at 797 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 798. Justice Abrahamson wrote that “[a] jury instruction must fully and fairly
inform the jury of the principles of law it should apply” in order to be upheld on appeal. Id.
184. Id.
185. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d at 798.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 771 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. 3d 2002). Interestingly, unlike in other cases which have been
discussed, Hancock had not been convicted of a prior sexual offense. Id. at 461-62. Instead, he
was charged with sexual assault and sexual abuse, and the state of Illinois decided to pursue civil
commitment rather than criminal charges in the matter. Id.
189. Id. at 462.
190. Id. at 462-63.
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trial level were constitutionally firm.191 In reaching this decision, the Illinois
Supreme Court decided the focus of Crane should be on its reaffirmation of the
Hendricks concern with distinguishing criminal and civil proceedings, rather
than on the ability of the respondent to control his sexual behavior.192
Massachusetts is another state that has rejected the need for a specific jury
instruction on the level of difficulty in controlling behavior in a case from May
2002, In re Dutil.193 Dutil was originally charged and sentenced to probation
for indecent assault and battery on a minor. He later violated his parole and
subsequently pled guilty to similar charges stemming from a separate
incident.194 Much like the Hancock court, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
focused on the Crane reaffirmation of the distinction between civil
commitment and criminal punishment as originally outlined in Hendricks.195
This focus allowed the court to interpret the sexually violent person
commitment law as implicitly requiring a mental condition, even if specific
terms are not used, and to interpret the instruction given as to the “general lack
of power to control” as consistent with Crane.196 This interpretation brings
Massachusetts in line with the other states that have rejected the specificity
required for jury instructions on lack of control, as pronounced in Thomas.
C. Missouri Got It Right – A Lack of Control Instruction is Necessary Under
Crane
Two very different views of the Crane decision have been laid out in these
state cases on the issues of lack of control and dangerousness. These
differences of opinion over Crane’s view of the issue ultimately boil down to
the necessity of a jury instruction. In terms of the states that have addressed
this issue, Thomas’ requirement of a specific instruction on lack of control is in
the minority.197 Three different factors lead to the conclusion that the Thomas
court reached the correct decision: a small piece of the Kansas Supreme
Court’s decision in In re Crane and the Supreme Court’s approach to that case;

191. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d at 466.
192. Id.
193. 768 N.E.2d 1055 (Mass. 2002). Dutil was convicted as a sexually dangerous person and
confined to a treatment center in 1988. Id. He appealed his commitment order on the basis of the
new constitutional standards he perceived Crane to have laid out. Id. at 1058-59.
194. Id. at 1060.
195. Id. at 1061.
196. Dutil, 768 N.E.2d at 1063-64.
197. The Iowa Supreme Court recently agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in
Thomas, becoming the first to join Missouri in this minority. See In re Detention of Barnes, 658
N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003) (finding that the jury instruction on the term “mental abnormality”
was inadequate because it did not require a showing of serious difficulty in controlling behavior
and adopting the instruction laid out by the Missouri Supreme Court in Thomas).
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the logic behind the Court’s majority opinion in Crane; and finally, the dismay
over the new standard set forth by the majority in Justice Scalia’s dissent.
The Kansas Supreme Court in In re Crane held that “the Act cannot be
applied to [Crane] in the absence of a finding that he was unable to control his
behavior.”198 Indeed, the Kansas court’s decision was replete with references
to the necessity of certain findings and instructions. The court then connected
the issues of finding and instructions in its summary of Hendricks when it
wrote that a constitutionally sufficient finding “is a question for the jury, which
was not instructed to make a finding as to Crane’s inability to control his
behavior.”199 The failure to make such an instruction on lack of control was
the reason the court reversed the commitment order of Crane, saying that “the
failure to so instruct the jury was error and requires that we reverse and remand
for a new trial.”200 In Crane, the United States Supreme Court said this
decision was “an overly restrictive” interpretation of Hendricks.201 The Court
in Crane did not take issue with the idea that some finding of dangerousness is
necessary for a proper commitment order and that an instruction on the point is
essential. Instead, the Court only challenged the Kansas Court’s determination
as to the degree of lack of control that must be established by the state in these
proceedings.
The strongest argument in support of the Thomas position on a jury
instruction is the majority opinion in Crane. The groundwork for Justice
Breyer’s opinion was the idea, reestablished by Hendricks, that a statute that
did not distinguish between ordinary recidivists and those sex offenders who
could not control their behavior because of a mental condition, would be
unconstitutional. While Crane vacated the opinion of the Kansas Supreme
Court, it did not decry the logic and reasoning of that court in finding it
necessary that an inability to control behavior be established for commitment
to be ordered. Instead, Crane took issue with the degree of lack of control
necessary before that threshold is reached. Crane does not support the
inference from the original trial court’s decision that the jury instructions,
which did not include lack of control, were constitutional. The majority
opinion made no such mention of the validity of the trial court’s instructions.
Ultimately, the very existence of the Crane decision mandates the conclusion
that the Court was requiring the establishment of at least, as the Thomas court
said, a “clarification” of the findings of mental abnormality. If lack of control,
as discussed in Crane, could simply be read into the current instructions of
sexual predator laws, as states such as Wisconsin and Florida have argued,

198.
199.
200.
201.

In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 290 (Kan. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002).
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then the Supreme Court would have restored the verdict of the original trial
jury as opposed to simply vacating the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Abrahamson made a very important point along this line in
her dissent in Laxton: “The majority opinion’s linkage or nexus analysis of the
jury instructions adopts Justice Scalia’s dissenting view in Crane.”202 Indeed,
the dissent by Scalia supports the conclusion that Crane established a new
requirement for sex offender commitment proceedings in order to maintain
constitutionality, as previously argued. Scalia’s entire argument was targeted
at the lack of necessity in the majority opinion because it should be permissible
for the current instructions to require a jury to make the lack of control finding
argued for by the majority.203 Scalia also said in his dissent that the majority
was “establishing the requirement of a separate finding of inability to control
behavior” in its decision.204 Furthermore, he thought this distinction and
clarification was unnecessary, which was the basis of his reasoning.
Scalia’s language in arguing against the majority’s “less precise
constitutional standard” also gives away the fact that he believed the Crane
decision was creating a jury instruction requirement. Much of his attack on the
potential problems that could be created by the majority decision stem from his
belief that it necessitated both the need for a finding and an instruction on lack
of control.205 As Scalia said, the majority decision is fundamentally flawed
because “it gives trial courts, in future cases under the many commitment
statutes similar to Kansas’s SVPA, not a clue as to how they are supposed to
charge the jury!”206 The fact that Scalia went into some depth in exploring
what necessary instructions should be given to juries in such cases,207 and that
he admonished the majority for its “irresponsibility” in failing to give the trial

202. In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784, 797 (Wis. 2002).
203. Crane, 534 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 419.
205. Id. at 420.
206. Id. at 423.
207. Scalia’s discussion of this issue is emphasized by his listing of potential jury charges:
How is one to frame for a jury the degree of “inability to control” which, in the particular
case, “the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality”
require? Will it be a percentage (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr.
Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is 42% unable
to control his penchant for sexual violence”)? Or a frequency ratio (“Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, you may commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is unable to control his penchant for sexual violence 3
times out of 10”)? Or merely an adverb (“Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may
commit Mr. Crane under the SVPA only if you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is
appreciably—or moderately, or substantially, or almost totally—unable to control his
penchant for sexual violence”)? None of these seems to me satisfactory.
Id at 423-24.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1180

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:1151

court specific instructions208 in this case, further substantiates the conclusion
that instructions themselves are what Crane requires.
All three important parts of the Crane decision on the state and federal
level point to the conclusion of the Missouri Supreme Court in Thomas that a
specific instruction is necessary on the issue of lack of control to ensure that
the due process protections of Crane are met. Chief Justice Abrahamson
articulated it best in her dissent in Laxton when she stated the following to both
the majority in Laxton and other state courts that have chosen to adopt the
position of Justice Scalia in Crane: “The court is obliged to follow the majority
opinion in Crane, not the dissent.”209 A more succinct summary of the
inadequacy of the state decisions in opposition to Thomas is not likely to be
formulated in other terms.
V. THE DANGER NEXT DOOR: WHY JURY INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT OFFER
ADEQUATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS IN COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
Assuming that a lack of control is required, as this Note argues, what
difference will this make in actual commitment proceedings? The answer to
this question is that an instruction will make little to no difference in the
likelihood of a jury ordering commitment of a convicted sex offender. An
excerpt from Crane illustrates this problem:
Ordinary recidivists choose to reoffend and are therefore amenable to
deterrence through the criminal law; those subject to civil commitment under
the SVPA, because their mental illness is an affliction and not a choice, are
unlikely to be deterred.210

In light of this distinction between those subject to commitment and those
who are not, along with the fact that nearly all those subject to commitment
proceedings are convicted sex offenders, the one avenue left open for a
defendant to avoid commitment in these proceedings is to argue that the
individual does not have a problem controlling behavior–rather, the
individual’s acts of sexual misconduct are willful and intentional! It seems
highly illogical to believe that a jury is going to release such a person into
society regardless of constitutional mandates or the manner in which it is
instructed.
The history of sexual predator laws also lends credence to the idea that
modern proceedings nearly guarantee an extended form of punishment for any
sex offender who is put before a jury. As Brakel and Cavanaugh noted in their
description of mid-twentieth century commitment laws, “[t]he procedural
shortcuts permitted by most statutes could be winked at, given the benign

208. Crane, 534 U.S. at 423-24.
209. In re Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784, 798 (Wis. 2002).
210. Crane, 534 U.S. at 420.
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intentions and predicted good outcomes” of these laws.211 Indeed, the entire
history behind the modern development of registration, community notification
and commitment laws speaks to the fact that such measures are designed to
alleviate public fears and protect them from these “monsters” who otherwise
would be living amidst the general public without the community’s knowledge.
It is also important to mention some of the other evidentiary rules that
govern these proceedings and how, in combination with known public fears of
sex offenders, they almost guarantee commitment of those targeted by the
State. Many states have rules that allow for the unsupervised examination of
offenders by state experts, the deposing of offenders, and the testimony of
victims at trial.212 Only in Wisconsin do proceedings guarantee the sex
offender the same rights as in a criminal trial, including Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination and the ability to decide whether or not a jury
trial is conducted. Such a system of proceeding raises serious concerns about
the legitimacy and integrity of the system, while also raising a number of
collateral situations that present potential problems.213
An examination of the Missouri sexual predator statutes and a recent case
on the ability to appeal a commitment order under the act lend insight into this
problem. While a “detained person” subject to possible commitment under the
law has a right to counsel, present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses,
Missouri law mandates that such an individual be examined by a state
psychologist for assessment, and that psychologist may also interview family
members and friends of the sex offender and the past victims of the sex
offender.214 In addition, at the trial itself, the state or the judge can decide to
have a jury trial regardless of the sex offender’s preference, although a jury
trial does require a unanimous decision on commitment to be effective.215

211. Brakel & Cavanaugh, supra note 33, at 72.
212. See generally Richard L. Polin, Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Proceedings: A
Proposal for Rules of Procedure, 75 FLA. BAR J. 51 (2001); Joelle Anne Moreno, Whoever Fights
Monsters Should See to it That in the Proces [sic] She Does not Become a Monster: Hunting the
Sexual Predator with Silver Bullets –Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 — and a Stake Through
the Heart – Kansas v. Hendricks,” 49 FLA. L. REV. 505 (1997).
213. A small point in In re Crane case illustrates one of these issues. At trial, Crane
attempted to stipulate to his past sexual behaviors and convictions, but the trial court held that
under the open door policy of the proceedings the State was allowed to illustrate his past history
in whatever manner it desired. In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 293 (Kan. 2000). See also Bradford v.
Mo. Dept. of Corrections, 46 Fed. Appx. 857 (8th Cir. 2002) (raising concerns over sex
offenders’ fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself or herself); Michael Booth, Court
Bars Civil-Commitment Waiver as Lure For Sex Offender’s Guilty Plea, 168 N.J. L.J. 171 (2002)
(reporting on a New Jersey court’s decision to disallow a prosecutor’s decision to waive the right
to seek post-incarceration civil commitment in exchange for a guilty plea to a sex offense).
214. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.489 (1999).
215. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 632.492, 632.495 (1999). As has been discussed, the likelihood of a
jury failing to return a commitment order in these cases is extremely low.
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Most importantly, because Missouri considers these cases to be civil matters
rather than criminal in nature, normal rules of criminal procedure and evidence
do not apply. Instead, the state is free to call the past victims of the sex
offender, introduce evidence of prior bad acts, and force the sex offender to
testify against himself in the form of the mandated psychological interviews by
the State.216 Such clear violations of the constitutional protections afforded a
defendant in a criminal proceeding are justified by the civil label that is applied
to the commitment proceedings.217
The problems created by this withdrawal of certain rights in the civil
setting in Missouri, and the confusion in the courts over the civil/criminal
dichotomy, is blazingly apparent in a recent decision, Ingrassia v. State.218 In
that case the Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
of Ingrassia, who was twice convicted of crimes of sexual misconduct and
ordered committed by a jury as a sexual predator in April 2001.219 The State
moved for the dismissal of Ingrassia’s appeal on the basis of the “escape rule,”
a judicially created doctrine in Missouri “that operates to deny the right of
appeal to a defendant who escapes justice.”220 Although the rule had only
previously been applied to criminal cases (and thus refers to the “defendant”
escaping), the court decided to extend the rule to civil commitment
proceedings involving an individual committed under the sexually violent
predator statutes. The court rationalized this decision by arguing that Ingrassia
had removed himself from their control, had created several administrative
difficulties, and the state was justified in trying to discourage escape by
sexually violent predators committed to institutions because Ingrassia’s escape

216. For criticism of similar encroachment on the rights of defendants in criminal cases
involving sexual offenses through the use of modified rules of evidence, see Moreno, supra note
212, and James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex
Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95 (1994). But see Sherry
L. Scott, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity
Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1729 (1999).
217. It could be argued that the sexual predator statutory requirements that precede a civil
commitment hearing overcome these evidentiary and jury concerns. These requirements include
diagnosis by a state psychiatrist as having a mental disorder, designation by a state official as a
sexual predator, and a preliminary hearing before a judge. Putting aside the scientific disputes
regarding diagnosis of sex offenders (see supra Section II, Part C) and the need to guarantee
constitutional protections at trial despite whatever might precede it, a number of cases reveal the
fact that questionable commitment decisions still occur. A good example of these problems
involve commitment as sex offenders of people who are clearly suffering from “normal” mental
illnesses. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 2002 WL 2017087, No. B152102 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4,
2002) (committing a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic as a sexual offender).
218. 2002 WL 31749394, No. ED 80012 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2002).
219. Id. at *1.
220. Id. at *1-2. (quoting State v. Troupe, 891 S.W. 2d 808, 809 (Mo. 1995) (en banc)).
Ingrassia had “escaped” from a mental institution in October 2002. Id. at *1.
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“demonstrates disrespect for our system of justice.”221 The Missouri Court’s
solution to the above concerns was an application of a criminal remedy to a
supposedly civil proceeding which, in effect, denies this group of individuals
the ability to have their rights adequately protected. Better evidence of the
difficulties in keeping the criminal versus civil distinction clear on the part of
judicial actors is hard to find and point to the inherent deficiencies in
maintaining the constitutionality of the statutes involved by a declaration that
they are civil in nature.222
VI. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Supreme Court described the dangers of the approach to
sexually violent predators that has been adopted by the states and approved by
the U.S. Supreme Court in the following manner:
[It has] the insidious effect of sanctioning the separation of the commitment of
sexually violent predators from the statutory procedure for the commitment of
the mentally ill. Once that is accomplished, the same reasoning could be
applied to anyone who commits any designated offense and is labeled
“mentally abnormal” or suffering from an “anti-social personality disorder.”223

This observation highlights the following two major theses of this Note: first,
that a jury that is not required to make a finding as to lack of control fails to
reach the constitutional standard established in Crane and second, such an
instruction, if given, will fail to overcome the inherent deficiencies of a civil
commitment scheme for sex offenders.
Public concern and fear of sex offenders will almost universally guarantee
a decision of commitment regardless of any constitutional restraints placed
before the jury.224 The ability of state governments to eradicate the rights and
protections of sex offenders through civil statutes shows the dangerous way in
which these powers can be used to infringe on constitutional rights. Efforts to
civilly commit other groups of people deemed dangerous show the lack of
limits to this perverse line of reasoning.225 When the costs and prior failures of

221. Id. at *3.
222. See generally Polin, supra note 212, for an analysis of possible rules of procedure for
one sexually violent predator statutory scheme.
223. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996).
224. See Michelle Johnson, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and The Sentencing of
Sexual Predators, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 39 (1998) (arguing that Hendricks is an example of
the Court bowing to public concern despite the absence of solid constitutional footing); Robert
Billbrey, Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: A Misguided Attempt to Solve a
Serious Problem, 55 J. MO. BAR 321 (1999); Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting
Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199 (2000).
225. For efforts on commitment of pregnant drug addicts and substance abusers, see David F.
Chavkin, “For Their Own Good”: Civil Commitment of Alcohol and Drug-Dependent Pregnant
Women, 37 S.D. L. REV. 224 (1992); Jean R. Schroedel & Pamela Fiber, Punitive Versus Public
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such a system are factored in, it becomes obvious that punitive measures
should be reserved for the states’ criminal justice systems, where fears and
treatment of sexual offenders can more properly be addressed. Under this
light, civil commitment can be seen as endemic of a criminal justice system
that focuses on punishment rather than rehabilitation, resulting in a system
forced to deal with convicts of all types who are likely to recommit.
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